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Abstract 
Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a growing and evolving North African franchise of Al 
Qaeda. While the group carries out a significant number of attacks within the Sahel, they have not 
executed attacks in the United States or Europe. There is significant research concerning the 
historical development of AQIM . However, there is a dearth of literature on the threat that this 
group poses to the United States. The purpose of this paper is to fill this research gap and 
evaluate the threat that AQIM poses to US security. My analysis will demonstrate that AQIM’s 
operations in Europe and Iraq are a security threat to US facilities and personnel. Moreover, this 
paper will demonstrate that AQIM has both the intent and capability to conduct attacks against 
US targets in Europe, Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Introduction 
In February 2007, a group calling itself “Al Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb” claimed responsibility 
for an attack in which six vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) detonated in 
towns east of Algiers. Although this attack officially marked the emergence of Al Qaeda of the 
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), a North African franchise of Al Qaeda, this group is the product of 
decades-long development of Islamist groups in Algeria. The merger of AQIM and Al Qaeda in 
2007 demonstrated Al Qaeda’s new trend of creating regional franchises across the world. 
Furthermore, this partnership precipitated an internationalization of AQIM’s goals and operations. 
The majority of literature and research on AQIM focuses on the historical transformation of a 
state-centric Algerian Islamist group into an international franchise of Al Qaeda. Blake Mobley 
and Eric Rosenbach of the Center for Policing Terrorism track the development of AQIM from its 
origins as the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) in the 1990s to its partnership with Al Qaeda in 2007.[1] 
Mobley and Rosenbach also analyze the training methods, means of finance and modus 
operandi of the group. Camille Tawil, in a piece published in the Terrorism Monitor, analyzes the 
transformation of AQIM strategy and tactics in the wake of 9/11.[2] Yet another piece on AQIM, 
written by Anthony Celso and published in Mediterranean Quarterly, expands on the themes that 
Tawil discusses in her article.  
Celso analyzes AQIM in the broader context of the post-9/11 Al Qaeda strategy of creating 
franchises in Islamic countries.[3] There are a multitude of other research pieces on AQIM, but 
they do not address the threat that AQIM poses to US security. 
This paper will address this demonstrated research gap and analyze the danger AQIM poses to 
the United States. First, this work will describe the development of Islamist groups in Algeria that 
resulted in the creation of AQIM. Second, even though AQIM does not pose an immediate threat 
to US homeland security, an analysis of AQIM operations in Europe and Iraq will demonstrate the 
threat to US security interests abroad, specifically, US government facilities and employees 
overseas. 
Historical Development of AQIM 
The emergence of Islamic extremist groups in Algeria traces back to the formation of the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS), established by mujahedeen returning from Afghanistan in the early 1990s. 
FIS, a legitimate Islamic political party, led in the 1991 Algerian general elections after the first 
round of voting. However, rather than allowing an Islamist party to rule the country, the Algerian 
military nullified the elections. This action precipitated the formation of the Armed Islamic Group 
(GIA) by members of the FIS party, and this newly-formed Islamist organization focused on the 
overthrow of the Algerian government. Furthermore, the cancellation of the 1991 elections 
sparked a civil war fought between the GIA and the government that continued until 1997.  
The end of the Algerian civil war and simultaneous outrage over civilian casualties led to dissent 
among GIA members and the ultimate formation of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC). Initially, GSPC operations were state-centric and focused on overthrowing the 
government and establishing an Islamic government in Algeria. However, by 2006 the group’s 
leadership developed a new strategic vision that involved regionalizing and globalizing GSPC 
operations and attacks. After years of overtures to Al Qaeda, the GSPC announced its 
partnership with Al Qaeda and new name of AQIM in December 2006. In September 2006, 
Ayman al Zawahari officially confirmed the partnership and new North African franchise of Al 
Qaeda. After the partnership, AQIM and its leader Abu Musab Abdul Wadood regionalized and 
globalized its operations.  
Since 2006, 96 AQIM attacks have occurred outside Algeria.[4] Moreover, since 2006 the tactics 
of AQIM increasingly take the form of Al Qaeda-style attacks. Specifically, AQIM has begun to 
utilize VBIEDs and suicide bombings. Examples of the new modus operandi include the 
simultaneous December 2007 VBIED attacks against a UN facility and the Algerian Constitutional 
Court in Algiers that killed 47 people.[5] More recently, in September 2008 five of twelve AQIM 
attacks that occurred in Algeria were either VBIEDs or suicide bombs.[6] While the partnership 
with Al Qaeda introduced a new goal of attacking western targets outside Algeria, AQIM has not 
executed attacks outside of Algeria thus far. 
AQIM Operations in Europe 
The ubiquitous presence of AQIM cells in Europe represents a significant threat to US security. 
Algerian Islamist groups established cells in Europe as far as back as the GIA in the early 1990s. 
Both the geographic proximity and the 9.1 million Algerian immigrants living across Europe 
allowed these organizations to establish cells across Europe.[7] After the splintering of the GIA, 
the GSPC requisitioned most of the GIA cells located in major cities across Europe. Since the 
collapse of the GSPC, AQIM has gradually taken over the Algerian Islamist network throughout 
Europe.[8] As a result, AQIM rapidly spread in the late 1990s, and the extent of its architecture 
was revealed in 2000 during a multitude of arrests in Italy, France and Spain. These arrests broke 
up three major operational cells that were together planning to bomb a French market.[9] 
Today, AQIM operates a widespread and coordinated structure across Europe. While the majority 
of their attacks and operations occur inside Algeria, AQIM maintains a widespread network of 
financial support and direct action cells outside the country. Terrorism analysts estimate that 
several dozen cells exist across Europe, primarily in France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the 
United Kingdom. French authorities estimate that there are over 5,000 AQIM sympathizers in 
France and approximately 500 dedicated cell members.[10] Additionally, EU authorities estimate 
that AQIM has substantially reinforced its presence in Germany and Italy since 2003.[11] A major 
task of AQIM cells in Europe is the financial support of the group’s operations worldwide. AQIM’s 
primary means of finance are car theft, credit card fraud, document forgery and the active seeking 
of donations. AQIM is extremely successful collecting donations in Europe, and in 2006 AQIM 
received 100,000 Euros in donations in Switzerland alone.[12] 
Another focus of AQIM cells in Europe is recruiting Algerian immigrants to fight. French 
authorities assert that several AQIM cells within France are actively recruiting volunteers for the 
Iraq jihad. Moreover, Spanish media outlets reported in April 2007 that AQIM supporters were 
collecting funds and recruiting volunteers for terrorist training in the mountains of Algeria.[13] A 
final focus of AQIM in Europe is the planning and execution of attacks against European targets. 
AQIM does not hide its intention to carry out attacks against European targets. In February 2005, 
for example, Al Qaeda leader Ayman Zawahiri urged AQIM to be a “bone in the throat of 
American and French crusaders.”[14]  
More recently, AQIM issued a new threat to France in response to a new French law banning the 
wearing of head scarves by Islamic women. AQIM leader Abdul Wadood stated in June 2009 that 
“we will avenge the honors of our sisters and daughters, on France and its interests in every way 
we can.”[15] These statements clearly demonstrate AQIM’s intentions to carry out attacks against 
European targets. In December 2006, French authorities raided a suspected AQIM safehouse 
and seized goggles, global positioning systems and weapons-making equipment.[16] This 
discovery confirmed European fears of the existence of AQIM direct action cells in Europe. 
Therefore, AQIM currently has both the cell structure and intention to carry out attacks in Europe. 
The robust presence of AQIM in Europe is a threat to US security. Specifically, the presence of 
direct action cells in Europe places US governmental facilities and personnel at risk. Due to post 
9/11 security measures, it is increasingly difficult for terrorists to carry out attacks in the United 
States. However, it is far less difficult for AQIM to attack US targets in Europe. AQIM can infiltrate 
operatives in Europe or utilize its pre-existing network to execute attacks on US facilities and 
personnel. For example, the primary Moroccan terrorist cells that carried out the 2004 Madrid 
train bombings crossed into Europe from North Africa. Due to the open border arrangements of 
the European Union (EU), once terrorist operatives enter the EU they are able to move freely 
within the EU.  
Additionally, French security analysts describe the ease at which AQIM members with dual 
citizenship can legally travel between France and Algeria.[17] The 2000 arrest of a GSPC cell in 
Italy that planned to bomb the US embassy in Rome further demonstrates the threat that AQIM 
poses to US personnel and facilities in Europe. These planned operations indicate AQIM’s desire 
to attack US infrastructure and personnel within Europe. This tactic also mimics the Al Qaeda 
strategy of striking at US targets in foreign countries, such as the 1998 Al Qaeda bombings of US 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. These sites are easier to access than targets in the United 
States and do not require an infiltration of fighters into US territory. 
In addition to the threat of an attack on US assets in Europe, the omnipresence of AQIM in 
Europe exacerbates the threat of an attack on US soil. While infiltrating the United States is 
increasingly difficult in the post-9/11 era, there are several instances of AQIM cells in Europe 
planning attacks on US soil. For example, in December 2005 three AQIM operatives were 
arrested by police in southern Italy while plotting attacks against ships, stadiums and railway 
stations in the United States.[18] The network of AQIM in Europe is an immediate and short-term 
threat to US homeland security as well as to its personnel and infrastructure in Europe. While 
AQIM has not successfully carried out an attack against a US target, it has both the intent and 
capability to execute such an operation. 
AQIM Operations in Iraq 
The operations of AQIM in Iraq represent a threat to the United States. Specifically, the funneling 
of Algerian jihad recruits into Iraq threatens US forces and operations. According to comments by 
senior US military officials, Algerians comprise approximately 20 percent of all Al Qaeda-affiliated 
fighters in Iraq.[19] Furthermore, Saudi Arabian intelligence estimates that in 2006 approximately 
1,200 Algerians were fighting with Al Qaeda in Iraq.[20] Not only are Algerian fighters present in 
Iraq in high numbers, they also participate in important operations for Al Qaeda in Iraq. For 
example, US forces killed two Algerians who facilitated communications between AQIM and Al 
Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and directed numerous bombings in Mosul.[21] Furthermore, AQIM 
operatives assassinated two Algerian diplomats in Baghdad in 2005.[22] 
The high number of Algerian fighters in Iraq results from the effective recruiting and channeling of 
individuals from Algeria. The primary focus of operations of AQIM in Algeria is attacking Algerian 
and western personnel and facilities. However, a secondary mission of AQIM is the active 
recruitment of young Algerian men to fight with AQI against US forces. This latter mission is 
largely due to Al Qaeda’s influence on the organization. Moroccan academic Muhammed Darif 
argues that “Al Qaeda’s priority in North Africa is to recruit fighters for Iraq…..it is part of its 
strategy to win the war in Iraq.”[23] AQIM has a widespread recruiting network within Algeria that 
is deeply entrenched within Algerian society. AQIM focuses much of its recruiting efforts on family 
members of its current operatives. Additionally, the group conducts recruiting at cyber cafes and 
mosques. For example, in October 2006 Algerian police arrested six AQIM members who were 
visiting mosques and persuading unemployed youth to fight in Iraq. In 2006 Algerian authorities 
arrested 120 AQIM-affiliated individuals in Algiers suspected of actively recruiting Algerians to 
fight in Iraq.[24] There also cells in Iraq responsible for receiving recruits sent by AQIM. For 
example, in 2005 the Syrian government deported Adil Sakir al-Mukni, a key facilitator between 
AQI and AQIM, for helping shuttle foreign fighters into Iraq.[25] 
Since 2008, many Algerian fighters have returned home from Iraq. This change is largely due to 
the tapering off of US operations in Iraq and the renewed focus of AQIM on overthrowing the 
Algerian government. The return of experienced fighters from Iraq has also brought the use of 
new and more devastating tactics, such as VBIEDs and suicide bombings, to Algeria.[26] 
However, the active recruitment of Algerians to fight in Iraq continues and is still a direct threat to 
US forces. Moreover, the recruiting methods and infrastructure established by AQIM could be 
used in the future to send Algerian fighters to Afghanistan or to other US military areas of 
operation. 
Conclusion 
AQIM is the outcome of years of development of Islamist groups in Algeria. AQIM is also one of 
the most glaring examples of the franchising of Al Qaeda. While there is significant research on 
AQIM’s development and transformation, there is a dearth of literature on the threat AQIM poses 
to the United States. This paper demonstrates AQIM’s threat to US security and highlights the 
need for policymakers to address this potential threat. AQIM operations in Europe and Iraq 
threaten the security of US government facilities and personnel overseas. Also importantly, the 
potential shift of AQIM operations from Iraq to Afghanistan could severely undermine Operation 
Enduring Freedom (OEF). In conclusion, the United States and its allies cannot take the AQIM 
threat lightly and should note that AQIM is growing and evolving to be more widespread and 
integrated with international terrorism. 
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